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You Can Have Your Cake and Redistrict It Too
GERDUS BENADÈ, Boston University
ARIEL D. PROCACCIA and JAMIE TUCKER-FOLTZ, Harvard University
The design of algorithms for political redistricting generally takes one of two approaches: optimize an objective
such as compactness or, drawing on fair division, construct a protocol whose outcomes guarantee partisan
fairness. We aim to have the best of both worlds by optimizing an objective subject to a binary fairness
constraint. As the fairness constraint we adopt the geometric target, which requires the number of seats won
by each party to be at least the average (rounded down) of its outcomes under the worst and best partitions of
the state; but we extend this notion to allow the two parties to compute their targets with respect to different
election datasets. Our theoretical contribution is twofold: we introduce a new model of redistricting that
closely mirrors the classic model of cake-cutting and we prove the feasibility of the geometric target in this
model. Our empirical results, which use real election data and maps of six US states, demonstrate that the
geometric target is feasible in practice and that imposing it as a fairness constraint comes at almost no cost to
three well-studied optimization objectives.
1 INTRODUCTION
To be elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, a candidate must win a plurality election in their
district. These districts are redrawn every decade based on the most recent census; the composition
and creation of districts are governed by both federal and state laws. At the federal level, the Voting
Rights Act requires that districts be drawn to allow minority groups to fully participate in the
democratic process. Locally, many states expect districts to be contiguous and several require
districts to be compact and respect “communities of interest.”
These guidelines, however, are often open to interpretation. For example, only six states specify a
metric by which compactness is measured; elsewhere the determination of whether or not a district
is compact is based on rules of thumb. Gerrymandering is the process of exploiting this flexibility
by carefully drawing district boundaries for political gain, for example to protect an incumbent or
to benefit (or suppress) a specific class, race or political party.
Gerrymandering has a long history. The term dates back to then-Governor of Massachusetts El-
bridge Gerry’s 1812 approval of a salamander-shaped district that was thought to aid his Democratic-
Republican Party. In 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that population inequality in redistricting
is justiciable, in part because there exist “judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it” [1]. The Supreme Court has also ruled against racial gerrymandering, for example in
1960 [18] and in 1993 [41]. By contrast, the Supreme Court has found it much harder to provide
clear guidance around partisan gerrymandering— the difficulty is, as Justice Kennedy put it, in
“providing a standard for deciding how much partisan dominance is too much” [26]. In response,
statistical approaches for detecting partisan gerrymanders were developed [7, 8, 13, 21]; such
methods have played a key role in the decisions made by courts in Pennsylvania [27] and North
Carolina [9] to strike down Congressional maps in these states. Several other states have taken
measures intended to prevent partisan gerrymandering, by establishing independent redistricting
commissions that typically include an equal number of Democratic and Republican members, as
well as unaffiliated voters.
It is evident, therefore, that regardless of the political or legal mechanism used to implement
them, there is a great need for rigorous methods for designing electoral district maps, which
we refer to as partitions. This problem is often approached from an optimization perspective
[16, 28, 34, 42, 43], which involves setting an objective— such as compactness, or the number of
“competitive” districts— and finding the optimal partition that satisfies various geographic and
demographic constraints like contiguity and population equality. However, optimization-based
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approaches do not necessarily lead to fair outcomes that would be acceptable to both major political
parties.
1.1 Our Approach
To address the shortcomings of the pure optimization-based approach, we propose to combine
it with ideas from fair division [4, 31] in a way that ideally enjoys the best of both worlds. On a
high level, we wish to enforce an intuitive yet rigorous notion of fairness that is also binary, in
the sense that it either is or is not satisfied— there is no question of degree. One key advantage
of such a notion is that it would allow a simple explanation of why a partition satisfying it is
fair [38]. Among all valid partitions that satisfy the fairness notion, we find one that optimizes
a given objective function. This approach—optimizing an objective function subject to a binary
fairness guarantee— is akin to recent practical success stories in fair division, such as a rent division
algorithm [15] that has been used to solve tens of thousands of real-world instances.
A key question, of course, is which fairness notion to use. One natural (albeit flawed) answer
is proportionality: the number of seats won by each party should be proportional to its statewide
support. Unfortunately proportionality is not a feasible standard [32]. For example, the Republican
party won roughly 32% of the Massachusetts statewide vote in the 2016 presidential election.
Strict proportionality suggests that Republicans should win three (roughly 32%) of the state’s
nine congressional seats. However, this is impossible: there is no partition that complies with
Massachusetts’ redistricting laws under which the Republican party wins any congressional seats
based on this election data [14], as the distribution of Republican-leaning voters across the state
is rather homogeneous. This is not necessarily disturbing in and of itself; Supreme Court rulings
“clearly foreclose any claim that the Constitution requires proportional representation” [10].
Instead, we employ the geometric target fairness notion of Landau and Su [25]. To motivate it from
our own viewpoint, imagine a procedure in which a fair coin is flipped, and whichever party wins
the coin flip is given absolute power to redistrict a state as they wish (subject to the relevant laws
regarding contiguity, population equality etc.). This procedure would lead to extremely partisan
partitions ex post, that is, after the coin is flipped. However, it is certainly impartial ex ante (before
the coin is flipped), as every party is equally likely to suffer or benefit from it. The geometric target
distills the essence of what makes this procedure fair, while avoiding its extreme partisan outcomes:
each party must win the expected number of districts it would win under the above procedure,
rounded down. In other words, the geometric target is the average, rounded down, of the maximum
number of districts the party would win under any partition that satisfies the legal constraints, and
the minimum number of districts the party would win under any such partition. We say that a
partition is a GT partition if the number of districts each party wins is at least its geometric target.1
For example, take the 2011 redistricting of Pennsylvania, which the state’s Supreme Court
ultimately struck down as unconstitutional and replaced with a remedial plan [27]. The political
poll aggregation website FiveThirtyEight published an “Atlas of Redistricting”
2
in which they study
redistricting across the United States. Part of this effort involved constructing gerrymandered
partitions that favor either of the major political parties. Taking these partitions as the most
extreme outcomes and evaluating on the presidential election data from 2016, we find that the pro-
Democratic map leads to nine Democratic congressional seats (out of 18) while the pro-Republican
map leads to five Democratic seats. Based on this the geometric target of the Democratic party (the
average of their extreme outcomes) is seven, compared to the five won under the 2011 plan.
1
Rounding is necessary, since it is impossible to guarantee that two parties each win, say, at least 4.5 districts out of nine.
2
See https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/redistricting-maps/.
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The foregoing example suggests that the guarantee given by the geometric target depends on
the underlying election data, which can be another source of contention—what happens if the
two parties disagree on which dataset should be used? One of our conceptual contributions is that
we explicitly allow the geometric targets of the two parties to be computed with respect to two
different datasets. Thus, no matter whether the discrepancies arise from genuine informational
disparities or deliberate attempts to achieve a more desirable outcome by manipulating data, any
honest party should be satisfied by the final redistricting outcome.
As intuitively appealing as this extension of the geometric target is, however, it would not be
useful if, like proportionality, it cannot be enforced— and so far there has been scant evidence that
it can (see Section 1.3). Even if it can be enforced, it could conceivably restrict the space of feasible
partitions to the point of significantly harming standard optimization objectives like compactness.
This motivates our research questions:
Do GT partitions exist in theory and are they feasible in practice? If so, is the geometric
target compatible with standard optimization objectives?
The validity of our proposed approach hinges on the answers to both questions being positive.
(Spoiler alert: they are.)
1.2 Overview of Results
To develop a theoretical understanding of the existence of GT partitions, we introduce a novel
model of redistricting that is inspired by the common model of cake cutting [4, 37, 39]. In our
model, the state is represented as an interval, with the goal being to partition the state into districts,
each of which is a finite union of closed intervals (this mirrors the typical assumption about pieces
of cake). The distribution of the supporters of each party across the state is represented through a
density function; the number of seats won by a party is the number of districts in which it has the
greater support.
Our main theoretical result (Theorem 2.2) is that GT partitions always exist in our model, even
when the geometric targets of the two parties are computed with respect to two different pairs of
density functions (corresponding to two different datasets). Despite the simplicity of our model,
this result is revealing because it overcomes one of the key obstacles to the design of fair partitions
(which is inherent in the model): the fact that the supporters of the two parties cannot be arbitrarily
divided between districts, as any subinterval is associated with a fixed number of supporters of
both parties. Our result is proved via a novel “cut-and-choose” protocol whereby one party divides
a strategically critical subset of the interval into two equal pieces and the other party decides which
party controls redisticting over which piece.
Having established the existence of GT partitions, we empirically assess the quality of those
partitions in terms of the optimization objectives of compactness, efficiency gap and the number of
competitive districts in six U.S. states. We find that restricting our search to GT partitions rarely
leads to a significant decrease in any of the three objectives, regardless of whether or not parties
agree on the voter distribution. We conclude that the price of enforcing geometric targets as a
notion of fairness is extremely low.
1.3 Related work
The connection between redistricting and fair division has inspired several papers that put forward
interactive protocols by which the parties take turns splitting the state and choosing pieces [3, 11, 24,
25, 35]. Of those, our work is most closely related to that of Landau and Su [25], who introduced the
geometric target. They analyze the LRY protocol of Landau, Reid, and Yershov [24], in which a neutral
administrator presents both parties with a sequence of bipartitions (𝐿1, 𝑅1), (𝐿2, 𝑅2), . . . , (𝐿𝑚, 𝑅𝑚) of
Gerdus Benadè, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Jamie Tucker-Foltz 3
the state into two pieces, with each 𝐿𝑖 ⊆ 𝐿𝑖+1. For each bipartition, both parties are asked whether
they would rather redistrict 𝐿𝑖 or 𝑅𝑖 , with the other party redistricting the other side. If a point
of agreement cannot be found, then there must be a specific 𝑖 at which both parties would prefer
redistricting 𝑅𝑖 to 𝐿𝑖 , but prefer redistricting 𝐿𝑖+1 to 𝑅𝑖+1, so randomness is used to determine
whether to use partition 𝑖 or 𝑖 + 1, and which party controls which piece. Landau and Su observe
that, if the feasible set of electoral maps is constrained to respect a given bipartition, then at least
one of the two options the parties are asked to choose between must meet their geometric target.3
However, this does not imply that the final outcome selected by the LRY protocol satisfies the
geometric target itself, even for the party whose preferred choice was selected. Moreover, the party
whose preferred choice was not selected cannot be guaranteed to have met even this weaker version
of the geometric target. Landau and Su acknowledge these shortcomings and informally argue
that they are unlikely to cause serious problems in practice, appealing to the random elements of
the protocol and the neutrality of the administrator. De Silva, Gales, Kagy and Offner [11] provide
a more rigorous treatment of the theoretical guarantees of the LRY protocol, showing that, in
the absence of any geometric constraints, both parties are guaranteed to win at least two seats
fewer than their geometric targets. However, under a simple grid-based model with a moderate,
plausible compactness constraint, they show that the number of districts won by a party can be
arbitrarily far from the geometric target. To the best of our knowledge, our paper presents the first
protocol that provably satisfies the geometric targets of both parties under a suitable model. Our
work also differs significantly because we study the geometric target from the viewpoint that it
should be enforced as an optimization constraint, allowing flexibility and compatibility with other
redistricting objectives. We view our protocol not as a practically implementable system, but rather
as a proof that GT partitions always exist, justifying our experimental approach as theoretically
sound.
Beyond the fair-division viewpoint, partisan symmetry [19, 22, 33] and the efficiency gap [44]
are alternative notions aimed at measuring how partisan a proposed plan is. Partisan symmetry
ensures anonymity by requiring that parties are treated identically in the sense that each party
would win the same number of seats as the other when they receive any particular fraction of the
vote. To determine whether a partition in which one party wins 65% of the seats with 53% of the
votes is impartial according to partisan symmetry, we must evaluate the number of seats the other
party would have won had they received 53% of the votes; indeed, this comparison must be done
for the entire spectrum of potential outcomes. These hypothetical outcomes are typically generated
by starting from a real election outcome (or a combination of several) and applying uniform [5] or
approximately uniform swings [17, 23] to model changes in voters’ political preferences. Practically,
uniform swings do not allow for the types of changes in voter preferences that occur in reality, and
requiring partisan symmetry under more general models of electoral systems can be infeasible. The
efficiency gap measures the net difference in the fraction of each party’s wasted votes— every vote
cast for the minority in a district is deemed to have been wasted, as are all votes for the majority
above the threshold required to win the district. Classic gerrymandering techniques like packing
(concentrating a party’s supporters in one district) and cracking (splitting a party’s supporters
into minorities in across many districts) lead to large efficiency gaps. A maximum efficiency gap
threshold of 8% has been proposed, although there are instances where this is impossible to attain.
On the optimization side, recent work has studied computational methods for redistricting from
the perspective that there is an inherent trade-off between fairness and compactness [20, 40, 45].
Under cardinal measures of fairness such as proportionality or the efficiency gap, there is a “Pareto-
frontier” of optimal partitions, at which improving fairness comes at a cost to compactness, and
3
This is referred to as the “good choice property” and is very easy to prove.
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vice versa. Our approach is fundamentally different because our fairness condition is a binary
constraint. Thus, our frontier necessarily has only two points: the most compact partition, and the
most compact partition satisfying the geometric targets of both parties. In contrast to the recent
work of Schutzman [40], we find that the trade-off is not significant, which is a testament to the
robustness and usefulness of the geometric target as a fairness requirement.
2 EXISTENCE OF GT PARTITIONS
In this section we develop a simple, continuous model of the redistricting problem, reminiscent of
the standard cake-cutting model [4, 37, 39], and prove that GT partitions always exist.
2.1 Model
We model the state as the unit interval [0, 1]. A district is a subset of [0, 1] that can be expressed
as a finite union of closed intervals. An instance of the state-cutting problem is specified by a
target number of districts𝑚 ∈ Z≥1, a set of 𝑛 parties 𝑁 , and a set of 𝑛2 voter distribution functions
{𝑣 𝑗
𝑖
| 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 } giving the measure of support for party 𝑗 according to party 𝑖 over any district. (We
only concern ourselves with the case where 𝑁 = {1, 2} in this paper.) We assume that each 𝑣 𝑗
𝑖
is
consistent with a measurable density function 𝑓
𝑗
𝑖











We additionally assume that the population density has been normalized so that, for any 𝑥 ∈ [0, 1]











(𝐷) = ` (𝐷),
where ` (𝐷) is the measure of 𝐷 . Figure 1 begins a hypothetical running example instance of the
state-cutting problem.
To discuss the number of seats won by a party with respect to a partition of [0, 1] into districts,
we are confronted with the technical issue of how to resolve perfect ties. Our solution is to assume
that whoever is drawing the electoral districts has the ability to resolve ties in whatever way they
wish. In other words, a district partition comes with a built-in tie-breaking rule, so to define a
partition, one must not only specify where within [0, 1] each district lies, but also who wins each
district in the case of a tie. Our results do not depend critically on this modeling choice; it is mainly
for elegance and ease of exposition. Formally, for any𝑚 ∈ Z≥1 and 𝑆 ⊆ [0, 1], an𝑚-partition of 𝑆 is
a pair (𝑃,𝑇 ), where 𝑃 = {𝐷1,𝐷2, . . . ,𝐷𝑚` (𝑆) } is a set of districts and 𝑇 : 𝑃 → 𝑁 is a tie-breaking
rule. Furthermore, 𝑃 must satisfy the following axioms:
(1) For all 𝑘 , ` (𝐷𝑘 ) = 1𝑚 .
(2) For all 𝑘1, 𝑘2, ` (𝐷𝑘1 ∩ 𝐷𝑘2 ) = 0.
(3)
⋃
𝑘 𝐷𝑘 = 𝑆 .
We write P(𝑚) for the set of all𝑚-partitions of [0, 1]. Given an instance of the state-cutting problem
and an𝑚-partition (𝑃,𝑇 ), we denote the number of districts won (in the sense of absolute majority)














and 𝑇 (𝐷) = 𝑗
)} .
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are shown in blue and red, respectively. This is a full specification of the instance, since we must have
𝑓 2
1
(𝑥) = 1 − 𝑓 1
1
(𝑥) and 𝑓 1
2
(𝑥) = 1 − 𝑓 2
2
(𝑥), and the voter distribution functions can be computed by taking
integrals, i.e., 𝑣1
1






(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = 0.1. The two parties agree on the distribution of voters over
[0, 0.5], but disagree everywhere else.
For each district 𝐷 in the set above, we say that party 𝑗 wins 𝐷 according to 𝑖 under (𝑃,𝑇 ). When
𝑗 = 𝑖 , we simply say 𝑖 wins 𝐷 under (𝑃,𝑇 ). A GT partition is an𝑚-partition (𝑃,𝑇 ) of [0, 1] such that,
for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 , the geometric target for party 𝑖 is satisfied:
𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝑃,𝑇 ) ≥

min
(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) ∈P (𝑚)
𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) + max(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) ∈P (𝑚) 𝑢
𝑖
𝑖 (𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′)
2
 .
For example, in the instance from Figure 1, we may define a 10-partition (𝑃,𝑇 ) by taking
𝑃 := {[0, 0.1], [0.1, 0.2], [0.2, 0.3], [0.3, 0.4], [0.4, 0.5],
[0.5, 0.6], [0.6, 0.7], [0.7, 0.8], [0.8, 0.9], [0.9, 1]}.
According to party 1, party 1 only wins districts [0.3, 0.4], [0.4, 0.5], [0.5, 0.6], and, depending on𝑇 ,
[0.2, 0.3]. Party 2 agrees with this assessment, except that party 1 also wins [0.6, 0.7] according
to party 2. As we will see in the next section, the geometric target for party 1 is to win at least
⌊ 0+8
2
⌋ = 4 districts, and the geometric target for party 2 is to win at least ⌊ 3+10
2
⌋ = 6 districts, each
according to their own voter distribution functions. Thus, if we set𝑇 ( [0.2, 0.3]) := 1, the geometric
target for party 1 will be satisfied; if we set 𝑇 ( [0.2, 0.3]) := 2, the geometric target for party 2 will
be satisfied; but there is no choice of tie-breaking rule satisfying both targets simultaneously. In
other words, for this choice of 𝑃 , there is no 𝑇 such that (𝑃,𝑇 ) is a GT partition.
Gerdus Benadè, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Jamie Tucker-Foltz 6


































































































2.2 Proof of Existence





meaning that both parties agree exactly on the distribution of party support. The following theorem
is superseded by our main result (Theorem 2.2), but it is nevertheless instructive as a warm-up.





GT partition always exists.
Proof. Let (𝑃1,𝑇1) be a best𝑚-partition of [0, 1] for party 1 (which is a worst𝑚-partition for
party 2), and let (𝑃2,𝑇2) be a worst𝑚-partition of [0, 1] for party 1 (which is a best𝑚-partition for
party 2). Without loss of generality assume each 𝑇𝑖 breaks ties in favor of party 𝑖 . For any given
𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}, we imagine bubble-sorting the disjoint intervals comprising the districts of 𝑃𝑖 , where the
sort key of an interval is the index of the district in 𝑃𝑖 to which it belongs. Each time two adjacent
intervals are swapped, we repartition the corresponding sub-interval to get a new partition, as
in Figure 2. In the end, we arrive at the simplest possible partition 𝑃∗, in which each district is
connected (like the example 𝑃 from Section 2.1). This creates a chain of partitions from 𝑃1 to 𝑃
∗
to
𝑃2, each differing from the previous one on at most 2 districts (the ones containing the adjacent
intervals that were swapped). Consistently using 𝑇1 to break ties, we have a chain of𝑚-partitions
from (𝑃1,𝑇1) to (𝑃2,𝑇1).
We claim that, at each step in this chain, the number of districts won by party 1 (and thus party 2
as well) changes by at most ±1. Suppose toward a contradiction that this was not the case at some
step, going from (𝑃,𝑇1) to (𝑃 ′,𝑇1). Let 𝑣1 denote the common function 𝑣11 ≡ 𝑣12 . Let the two districts
on which 𝑃 and 𝑃 ′ differ be 𝐷1, 𝐷2 ∈ 𝑃 and 𝐷 ′1, 𝐷 ′2 ∈ 𝑃 ′. Since we are breaking ties in favor of party
1, the only way that the number of wins can differ by at least 2 is if party 1 has a weak majority





; or a strict minority in 𝐷1 and 𝐷2, and a weak




. These two cases are completely analogous, so we only consider the former
case, i.e., 𝑣1 (𝐷1) ≥ 1
2𝑚
, 𝑣1 (𝐷2) ≥ 1
2𝑚








. Then, by the additivity of 𝑣1,
1
𝑚




We have a contradiction, so the number of districts won by party 1 can change by at most ±1 at
each link in the chain.
Finally, we extend the chain by𝑚 more steps from (𝑃2,𝑇1) to (𝑃2,𝑇2) by changing the tie-breaking
rule one district at a time. Again, the number of wins for party 1 changes by at most ±1 at each
step. Thus, at some point in the middle of the chain of𝑚-partitions from (𝑃1,𝑇1) to (𝑃2,𝑇2), the
rounded average number of wins for each party between these two extremes is realized. □
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Our main result, which we now state and begin to prove, concerns the general case where the
parties may disagree on the distribution of voters.
Theorem 2.2. Given any instance of the state-cutting problem in which 𝑁 = {1, 2}, a GT partition
always exists.
To prove this theorem, we need some more definitions and lemmas. We begin by observing that
it is possible to subdivide any district into two smaller districts of arbitrary sizes with the same
fraction of party support as the original district.
Lemma 2.3. Given a voter distribution function 𝑣 , a district 𝐷 , and a real number 𝑠 ∈ [0, 1], there
exist districts 𝐷1 and 𝐷2 such that
(1) 𝐷1 ∪ 𝐷2 = 𝐷 ,
(2) ` (𝐷1 ∩ 𝐷2) = 0,
(3) ` (𝐷1) = 𝑠` (𝐷), ` (𝐷2) = (1 − 𝑠)` (𝐷), and
(4) 𝑣 (𝐷1) = 𝑠𝑣 (𝐷), 𝑣 (𝐷2) = (1 − 𝑠)𝑣 (𝐷).
The proof uses a fixed-point argument— see Appendix A for the details. By iteratively applying
Lemma 2.3, we obtain a more general form. This proof is completely straightforward, and hence
omitted.
Lemma 2.4. Given a voter distribution function 𝑣 , a district 𝐷 , and 𝑠 ∈ R>0 ∪ {∞}, there exist
districts 𝐷1,𝐷2, . . . ,𝐷 ⌊1/𝑠 ⌋ such that
(1) for all 𝑘 , 𝐷𝑘 ⊆ 𝐷 ,
(2) for all 𝑘1 ≠ 𝑘2, ` (𝐷𝑘1 ∩ 𝐷𝑘2 ) = 0,
(3) for all 𝑘 , ` (𝐷𝑘 ) = 𝑠` (𝐷), and
(4) for all 𝑘 , 𝑣 (𝐷𝑘 ) = 𝑠𝑣 (𝐷).
Throughout the remainder of this section, fix an instance of the state-cutting problem satisfying




( [0, 1]) ≤ 1
2
, and a majority party according to 𝑖 if 𝑣 𝑗
𝑖
( [0, 1]) ≥ 1
2
. When 𝑗 = 𝑖 , we simply say 𝑖 is a
minority/majority party. Note that this definition is merely with respect to the data of party 𝑖 , so
even if the inequalities are strict, it is still possible for both parties to be minority parties or both
parties to be majority parties. Say that a district 𝐷 is competitive4 for 𝑖 if 𝑣 𝑗
𝑖
(𝐷) = ` (𝐷)
2
for some
𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 (in which case it will clearly be true for all 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 , since there are only two parties), and let
𝑀𝑖 := {𝑚` (𝐷) | 𝐷 is a competitive district for 𝑖 and𝑚` (𝐷) ∈ Z}.
Since𝑀𝑖 is a nonempty set of integers that is bounded above (by𝑚), it contains a maximum value.
Let𝑚𝑖 ∈ Z≥0 be this maximum, and let 𝑋𝑖 be one of the districts 𝐷 attaining it, i.e.,𝑚` (𝑋𝑖 ) =𝑚𝑖 .
Note that𝑚𝑖 might be 0, in which case 𝑋𝑖 is empty.
Intuitively, 𝑋𝑖 is the most strategically critical portion of [0, 1] according to party 𝑖 , where both
parties have the same level of support, so either party could hope to win districts by gerrymandering.
Figure 3 shows the sets 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 for our running example (in this case they are both uniquely
defined, up to adding sets of measure zero). Since 𝑚 = 10, we have 𝑚1 = 𝑚` (𝑋1) = 7 and
𝑚2 =𝑚` (𝑋2) = 8.
The next five lemmas characterize the best and worst partitions for each party in terms of the𝑚𝑖
values, giving necessary and sufficient conditions for satisfying the geometric targets.
4
This technical definition of “competitive” in our model is completely different than the empirical definition discussed in
Section 3.
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( [0, 1]) − 1
2
is ≥ 0 and the other is ≤ 0. Then ` (𝑌 ) < 𝑚𝑖+1
𝑚
.
Proof. Suppose toward a contradiction that
` (𝑌 ) ≥ 𝑚𝑖 + 1
𝑚
.





𝑔(𝑡) := 𝑣 𝑗
𝑖
(𝑌 ∪ [0, 𝑡]) − ` (𝑌 ∪ [0, 𝑡])
2
.
Clearly, 𝑔 is continuous. Furthermore,
𝑔(0) = 𝑣 𝑗
𝑖
(𝑌 ) − ` (𝑌 )
2
,
𝑔(1) = 𝑣 𝑗
𝑖





( [0, 1]) − 1
2
.
By assumption, one of these terms must be ≥ 0 and the other ≤ 0. Therefore, by the intermediate











i.e., 𝐷 is competitive for 𝑖 . Since 𝑌 ⊆ 𝐷 ,
` (𝐷) ≥ ` (𝑌 ) ≥ 𝑚𝑖 + 1
𝑚
.
Thus, we may apply Lemma 2.3 to voter distribution function 𝑣
𝑗
𝑖
, with 𝑠 :=
𝑚𝑖+1
𝑚` (𝐷) ∈ [0, 1], to cut
out a district 𝐷1 ⊆ 𝐷 of measure
` (𝐷1) =
𝑚𝑖 + 1




Furthermore, observe that, since 𝐷 is competitive for 𝑖 , it follows from property (4) of Lemma 2.3




(𝐷1) = 𝑠 · 𝑣 𝑗𝑖 (𝐷)
= 𝑠 · ` (𝐷)
2













This proves that𝑚𝑖 + 1 ∈ 𝑀𝑖 , contradicting the definition of𝑚𝑖 as the maximum element of𝑀𝑖 . □
Lemma 2.6. For any 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 , if 𝑗 is a minority party according to 𝑖 , then:
min




(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) = 0
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max




(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) =𝑚𝑖




, with 𝑠 := 1
𝑚
, to divide [0, 1] into𝑚 districts 𝐷1,𝐷2, . . . ,𝐷𝑚 of equal size 1𝑚 . In each district 𝐷𝑘 ,










( [0, 1]) ≤ 1
2𝑚
Therefore, if we break ties in favor of party 𝑗 ′, party 𝑗 will win none of these districts. Formally,
letting 𝑃 ′ := {𝐷1,𝐷2, . . . ,𝐷𝑚} and 𝑇 ′(𝐷𝑘 ) := 𝑗 ′ for each 𝑘 ∈ [𝑚], we have that 𝑢 𝑗𝑖 (𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) = 0,
proving the first equation.
To prove the second equation, we apply Lemma 2.4 to 𝑣
𝑗
𝑖
, with 𝑠 := 1
𝑚𝑖
, to divide 𝑋𝑖 into 𝑚𝑖
districts 𝐷1,𝐷2, . . . ,𝐷𝑚𝑖 . Note that, by property (3) of Lemma 2.3, each district 𝐷𝑘 has size









Furthermore, since 𝑋𝑖 is competitive for 𝑖 , it follows from property (4) of Lemma 2.4 that each 𝐷𝑘 is
competitive for 𝑖 . Let 𝑃 ′ consist of 𝐷1,𝐷2, . . . ,𝐷𝑚𝑖 , along with an arbitrary division of [0, 1] \ 𝑋𝑖 (the
closure of the complement of 𝑋𝑖 ) into𝑚 −𝑚𝑖 districts, and let 𝑇 ′(𝐷𝑘 ) := 𝑗 for each 𝑘 ∈ [𝑚𝑖 ], with
an arbitrary tie-breaking choice for all of the other districts. Since the 𝐷𝑘 districts are competitive





(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) ≥ 𝑚𝑖 ,
which proves that
max




(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) ≥ 𝑚𝑖 .
To prove the other direction, suppose toward a contradiction that, for some𝑚-partition (𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′)
of [0, 1], 𝑢 𝑗
𝑖
(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) ≥ 𝑚𝑖 + 1. Let 𝑌 ⊆ [0, 1] be the union of all districts won by 𝑗 according to 𝑖
under (𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′). Since there are at least𝑚𝑖 + 1 such districts, each of measure 1𝑚 , we have







(𝑌 ) − ` (𝑌 )
2
≥ 0




( [0, 1]) − 1
2
≤ 0
since party 𝑗 is a minority party according to 𝑖 . Therefore, by Lemma 2.5, we have
` (𝑌 ) < 𝑚𝑖 + 1
𝑚
,
contradicting inequality (1). □
Lemma 2.7. For any 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 , if 𝑗 is a majority party according to 𝑖 , then:
min




(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) =𝑚 −𝑚𝑖
max




(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) =𝑚
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Proof. Let 𝑗 ′ denote the party that is not 𝑗 . Note that 𝑗 ′ must be a minority party according to 𝑖 .




(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) + 𝑢 𝑗
′
𝑖
(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) =𝑚.
Therefore,
min




(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) = min
(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) ∈P (𝑚)
(












where the final equality follows from Lemma 2.6 and the fact that 𝑗 ′ is a minority party according
to 𝑖 . By the same reasoning, we analogously derive
max




(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) = max
(𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) ∈P (𝑚)
(













Lemma 2.8. For any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and𝑚-partition (𝑃,𝑇 ) of [0, 1], if party 𝑖 is a minority party, then (𝑃,𝑇 )





districts under (𝑃,𝑇 ).
Proof. This follows immediately from specializing 𝑗 := 𝑖 in Lemma 2.6, since the geometric









Lemma 2.9. For any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and𝑚-partition (𝑃,𝑇 ) of [0, 1], if party 𝑖 is a majority party, then (𝑃,𝑇 )





districts under (𝑃,𝑇 ).
Proof. This follows from specializing 𝑗 := 𝑖 in Lemma 2.7, since the geometric target is for party
𝑖 to win at least⌊




























districts under (𝑃,𝑇 ), then (𝑃,𝑇 ) satisfies the geometric target for 𝑖 .
Proof. Let 𝑗 denote the party that is not 𝑖 . If 𝑖 is a minority party, the result follows immediately
from Lemma 2.8. If 𝑖 is a majority party, then, by Lemma 2.9, the geometric target is for party





districts. Suppose toward a contradiction that (𝑃,𝑇 ) did not meet the





districts under (𝑃,𝑇 ). Let (𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′) be
the𝑚-partition of [0, 1] where 𝑃 ′ := 𝑃 and 𝑇 ′(𝐷) := 𝑗 for all 𝐷 ∈ 𝑃 ′. With the new tie-breaking





competitive districts that party 𝑖 won under (𝑃,𝑇 ) are instead won by





fewer districts under (𝑃 ′,𝑇 ′), which
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Fig. 3. The same instance of the state-cutting problem from Figure 1, annotated with some of the sets
described in the proof of Theorem 2.2. Note that 𝑖 = 1 and 𝑗 = 2 since ` (𝑋1) > ` (𝑋2).
districts in total. This contradicts the minimum value from Lemma 2.7. □
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2.2. Roughly, the proof is via a cut-and-choose protocol
where the party 𝑗 with the smallest 𝑋 𝑗 set is the cutter, and the other party is the chooser. The
cutter divides 𝑋 𝑗 into two pieces such that they can meet their geometric target as long as they
control the redistricting over either piece. Thus, the chooser must cede control over one of these
two pieces in a way that still enables them to form enough districts from the remains to meet their
own geometric target. To decide which piece is better, there are two different cases, depending on
whether the chooser is a minority or a majority party. Here we will only prove the minority case,
deferring the more complicated majority case to Appendix B.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Choose 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 = {1, 2} so that 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 and𝑚𝑖 ≥ 𝑚 𝑗 . Party 𝑗 will be the




on district 𝑋 𝑗 , with 𝑠 :=
1
2
, obtaining districts 𝐷1 and 𝐷2 satisfying the four properties. See Figure 3
for an example of one valid choice of 𝐷1 and 𝐷2. Note that, for each 𝑘 ∈ {1, 2}, from property (3) of
Lemma 2.3 we have
` (𝐷𝑘 ) =






while from property (4), 𝐷𝑘 is competitive for 𝑗 since 𝑋 𝑗 is.
We claim that, for any 𝑘 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2}, it is possible to create an𝑚-partition of a subset of 𝐷𝑘 𝑗 such
that, no matter how this partition is extended into an𝑚-partition of [0, 1], the geometric target for
party 𝑗 is satisfied.
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To prove this, we apply Lemma 2.4, to 𝑣
𝑗
𝑗














from 𝐷𝑘 𝑗 . From property (3) of Lemma 2.4, for each 𝐸𝑘 district,












and, from property (4), each of these districts is competitive for 𝑗 since 𝐷𝑘 𝑗 was. Thus, defining




competitive districts under (𝑃𝑘 𝑗 ,𝑇𝑘 𝑗 ), so any extension of (𝑃𝑘 𝑗 ,𝑇𝑘 𝑗 ) satisfies the geometric target
for 𝑗 by Lemma 2.10.
It thus remains to establish that, for some 𝑘 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2}, we can extend (𝑃𝑘 𝑗 ,𝑇𝑘 𝑗 ) to an𝑚-partition
of [0, 1] that satisfies the geometric target for party 𝑖 . There are two cases, depending on whether
party 𝑖 is a minority or majority party (according to 𝑖).
Suppose 𝑖 is a minority party, as is the case in Figure 3. One plausible idea is to choose the 𝑘 𝑗
making 𝐷𝑘 𝑗 ∩ 𝑋𝑖 as small as possible, so that party 𝑖 still retains enough control over 𝑋𝑖 to meet
their geometric target. However, as Figure 3 illustrates, this strategy does not always work. In this
example, ` (𝐷1 ∩ 𝑋𝑖 ) < ` (𝐷2 ∩ 𝑋𝑖 ), so we would presume to pick 𝑘 𝑗 = 1. Since 𝐷1 happens to be
competitive for party 𝑖 , it can be partitioned such that party 𝑖 wins no districts, and party 𝑖 can






= 4 districts (by Lemma 2.8). Thus, we must more carefully choose 𝑘 𝑗 to ensure that party
𝑖 still has a majority of support within 𝑋𝑖 \ 𝐷𝑘 𝑗 , which, in this example, will be 𝑘 𝑗 = 2.
Formally, from equation (2) it follows that, for all 𝑘 ∈ {1, 2},









Therefore, it is possible to enlarge 𝐷1 ∩ 𝑋𝑖 and 𝐷2 ∩ 𝑋𝑖 into districts 𝐷 ′1, 𝐷 ′2 ⊆ 𝑋𝑖 that exactly











Since 𝑋𝑖 is competitive for 𝑖 ,
0 = 𝑣𝑖𝑖 (𝑋𝑖 ) −
` (𝑋𝑖 )
2
















Therefore, the two terms in parentheses cannot both be negative. Let 𝑘𝑖 ∈ {1, 2} be such that
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Fig. 4. The final 10-partition meeting the geometric targets of both parties, with districts numbered in the
order they are constructed in the proof of Theorem 2.2. The red districts 1-3 come from (𝑃𝑘 𝑗 ,𝑇𝑘 𝑗 ), so have




), so have ties broken in
favor of party 𝑖 = 1 (though in this case, it does not matter, since districts 4-7 are not competitive). The white
districts 8-10 could be re-partitioned arbitrarily, and have ties broken in any way. Party 𝑖 = 1 expects to win
districts 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7, exceeding their geometric target of four districts, while party 𝑗 = 2 expects to win all
except district 5, exceeding their geometric target of six districts.
from 𝐷 ′
𝑘𝑖
. According to property (3), each district 𝐹𝑘 does indeed have the target size of











Furthermore, from property (4), each district 𝐹𝑘 has party support
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We define the tie-breaker over each 𝐹𝑘 district by 𝑇
′
𝑘𝑖











) and (𝑃𝑘 𝑗 ,𝑇𝑘 𝑗 ) (which are necessarily disjoint since 𝐷 ′𝑘𝑖 and 𝐷𝑘 𝑗 are), dividing the






the geometric target for party 𝑖 is satisfied by Lemma 2.8. Figure 4 shows the final 10-partition for
our running example.
The case where 𝑖 is a majority party is more involved since it is no longer sufficient for party 𝑖 to
assume they lose all districts in either 𝐷1 or 𝐷2. It may happen that both choices of 𝑘 𝑗 to lead to a
situation where it is impossible to form enough districts from [0, 1] \ 𝐷𝑘 𝑗 to meet the geometric
target for party 𝑖 . This is because both 𝐷1 and 𝐷2 could be “packed” districts, in which party 𝑖 wins
by a large margin, wasting their advantage. However, when this happens, there is a strategy that
party 𝑖 can use to respond: given a choice of 𝑘 𝑗 , party 𝑖 forms a packed district in [0, 1] \ 𝐷𝑘 𝑗 that
party 𝑗 wins for each packed district in 𝐷𝑘 𝑗 that party 𝑖 wins. We argue that, for some choice of
𝑘 𝑗 , party 𝑖 will be left with majority over the remainder of the interval after forming these packed
districts, so will be able to win all remaining districts. Since the wins in packed districts exactly
cancel each other out, this implies that party 𝑖 meets their geometric target. See Appendix B for the
details. □
3 GT PARTITIONS IN PRACTICE
Having established the existence of GT partitions in an abstract model, now we empirically in-
vestigate whether GT partitions exist in practice and what they look like. In the spirit of the price
of fairness [2, 6], we are particularly interested in the trade-off between satisfying the geometric
target and various optimization objectives; that is, we investigate to what degree GT partitions are
inferior to those that optimize traditional measures of quality.
A first challenge, though, is computation. Ideally, we would like to exactly optimize for the
number of districts each party can win and use these optimal solutions to compute the geometric
targets. Unfortunately, state-of-the-art machinery does not support exact optimization over the
entire space of feasible partitions at the scale of real-world instances. We therefore rely on a heuristic
evaluation of the extreme partitions; specifically, we use the GerryChain software developed by
the Voting Rights Data Institute [46] to facilitate the running of a Markov chain which generates
thousands of valid partitions. The Markov chain starts from a graph representation of the state in
which every node represents an indivisible geographic region (for example, a precinct or census
block), along with properties associated with that region, including population, area, perimeter, and
the number of Democratic and Republican votes cast in several recent elections. State transitions
in the Markov chain happen through recombination moves [12] which merge two adjacent districts
before randomly splitting them again. Before a move to a new partition is accepted, it is verified that
the new partition is contiguous and satisfies population equality to within 2% (with the exception
of Virginia, where a bound of 5% is used). The precinct geometries and election data used in these
experiments were prepared by the Metric Geometry and Gerrymandering Group and are publicly
available [30].
We generate 50 000 valid partitions
5
(of which the first 1 000 are discarded) in six U.S. states:
Georgia (GA), Massachusetts (MA), North Carolina (NC), Pennsylvania (PA), Texas (TX), and
Virginia (VA). At every partition found by the Markov chain we keep track of three metrics:
• The efficiency gap, as defined in Section 1.3;
5
This relatively small number of steps in the Markov chain is due to the fact that we are using recombination moves. If
smaller, more local moves were used to traverse the space of partitions, several million would have been required [29].
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GA MA NC PA TX VA
# Districts 14 9 13 18 36 11
Democratic vote share (%) 47.6 64.7 48.1 49.6 45.3 52.5
Democratic GT 4 9 5 7 15 7
Republican GT 9 0 8 11 21 4
Competitive districts 7 2 8 8 12 (13) 6
Efficiency gap (%) 6.0 (0*) 20.7 4.1 (0*) 5.4 (1.2) 0.1 (0*) 4.2 (0*)
Compactness (PP) 0.214 0.354 0.262 0.222 (0.225) 0.194 (0.2) 0.25
Table 1. For each state, its number of Congressional districts, the normalized Democratic vote share in the
2016 presidential election (calculated from the numbers published in the New York Times by discarding
votes for third-party candidates), the Democratic and Republican geometric targets, and for each of three
optimization objectives, the optimal value subject to satisfying the geometric target and the optimal value
without this constraint (in parentheses, where different). Absolute efficiency gaps of 0∗ do not exceed 0.05%.
• The number of competitive districts, defined to be those districts in which the majority party
wins no more than 54% support; and
• Compactness as measured by the Polsby-Popper (PP) score [36], computed as the ratio of the
area of a district to the area of a circle with the same perimeter length.
Note that a smaller efficiency gap is better— a threshold of 8% is commonly accepted [44]—while
we prefer a larger number of competitive districts and a larger Polsby-Popper score.
Along with these metrics we compute the number of districts won by each party according to
their belief of voter preferences. This allows us to calculate the geometric targets and measure the
price of fairness.
3.1 When Parties Agree About Voter Distributions
First, we consider the case where both parties agree about the distribution of voters. In this case
we use the votes cast in the 2016 presidential election to evaluate the number of districts won by
each party in every partition. In all of our experiments, we find that GT partitions exist. Table 1
reports the best observed values for each metric among GT partitions, as well as the optimal value
observed among all partitions (when different). Geometric targets are computed by taking the
average (rounded down) of the minimum and maximum number of districts won by a party in any
partition.
We see in Table 1 that the cost of enforcing the geometric target is very low. There is only one
instance of a state (TX) in which this constraint leads to a decrease in the number of competitive
districts compared to the maximum competitive districts observed, while the decrease in compact-
ness is never more than 3%. The increase in efficiency gap is larger (4-6%); however, we observe
GT partitions meeting the recommended efficiency gap threshold of 8% in every state (except MA,
where meeting the threshold is impossible).
We did not explicitly consider optimizing multiple objectives simultaneously; nevertheless, we
observe several GT partitions that outperform the currently implemented partitions in these states
on all three axes. Figure 5 shows two such GT partitions, one in Virginia and one in North Carolina.
The Virginian partition has three competitive districts (compared to two in their 2012 plan), an
absolute efficiency gap of 6.6% (compared to 10.9%) and a compactness score of 0.185 (compared
to 0.158). Similarly, the partition of North Carolina has three competitive districts (compared to
0 in their 2016 map), an efficiency gap of 7.1% (compared to 22.2%) and a Polsby-Popper score of
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Fig. 5. GT partitions in Virginia (left) and North Carolina (right) which outperform their implemented plans
in terms of competitiveness, efficiency gap and compactness.
0.262 (compared to 0.252). The implemented plans are not only worse according to all three of our
metrics, they also do not satisfy the geometric targets.
3.2 When Parties Disagree About Voter Distributions
The core strength of our theoretical result is that it does not require parties to agree on how voters
will vote, as geometric targets can be guaranteed with respect to separate beliefs for each party.
These divergent beliefs may be due to noisy data collection, polling errors or strategic manipulation.
To simulate such settings, we consistently let one of the parties report the true votes cast in
the 2016 Presidential election, which we treat as the ground truth for the purpose of computing
competitiveness and efficiency gaps. The other party’s beliefs are allowed to deviate in several
structured ways. First, we consider the case where the other party expects the votes to reflect
the 2012 Presidential election.
6
Second, in an attempt to simulate possible strategic behavior, we
consider what happens when the party uniformly under or over-reports their share of the votes
in every region by 𝑥%, for 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 = {5, 10, . . . , 50}. Finally, we consider the case where a party
randomly inflates or deflates their share of the votes in each region (independently) by 𝑦%, with
𝑦 ∼ Uniform(−𝑥, 𝑥), 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 .
As in the case where parties agree, in all of our experiments, we find that GT partitions exist.
Figure 6 compares the most competitive and compact GT partitions observed in Texas for each of
the deviations we consider. In most of the scenarios, enforcing the geometric target led to the loss
of at most one competitive district; the largest number of competitive districts lost was 3. In terms
of compactness (measured by the Polsby-Popper score) the largest loss was when the Democratic
party deflated their reported beliefs uniformly by 25%, leading to a GT partition with a compactness
score of 0.183 compared to the optimum of 0.200. The same trends held in the setting where the
alternative voter distribution is from a different election. The effect of enforcing the geometric
targets on competitiveness and compactness are similar in the other states, and we observed GT
partitions meeting the efficiency gap threshold everywhere (with the obvious exception of MA).
The full results from all experiments appear in Appendix C.
Together these results tell a compelling story: not only is it easy to find GT partitions, but
restricting our search to GT partitions has little impact on the quality of the partition according to
traditional metrics.
4 DISCUSSION
Our suggested redistricting approach relies on optimization subject to a fairness constraint. The
fact that our fairness notion is readily satisfied— there are likely thousands of GT partitions for any
state— creates the opportunity to use it in isolation should optimization-based approaches prove
6
With the exception of Georgia and Virginia. Due to the availability of data we use election results from a 2016 senate race
as the alternative voter distribution in Georgia, and the 2016 congressional races in Virginia.
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Fig. 6. The largest number of competitive districts (left panel) and degree of compactness (right) of the best
GT partitions observed in Texas when parties inflate or deflate their reported voter distribution by up to
50%. The black dotted line represents the maximum value observed among any partition. The color of the
bar represents which party deviates. The golden bars report the experiment where neither party deviates,
which is also recorded in the TX column of Table 1 (so in each panel, all four golden bars represent the same
experiment).
impossible, either because of political objections or legislative difficulties. In such cases simply
requiring that partitions meet the geometric target prevents the most extreme partisan outcomes
yet allows legislators to retain much of the power and freedom that comes with the ability to decide
where to draw district boundaries.
We have argued that, despite its simplicity, our theoretical model captures some of the key diffi-
culties of practical redistricting. Nevertheless, it could be made richer by incorporating geometric
aspects of the redistricting problem, so that the price of fairness for compactness could be formally
analyzed. One natural metric for compactness is to count the number of disjoint intervals per
district. In the worst case, GT partitions may require an arbitrarily large number of intervals in
some districts. Furthermore, imposing geometric constraints on the set of feasible partitions, such
as “there must be at most two intervals per district” can lead to situations where GT partitions do
not exist.
7
Perhaps there is a 2D adaptation of our model under which geometric constraints are
still compatible with the geometric target.
A shortcoming of our approach is the issue of computation. A specific problem is that using
the minimum and maximum number of seats won by both parties across sampled partitions to
compute the geometric targets does not necessarily lead to the true value: in theory, there could be
more extreme partitions that were not observed. However, this seems highly unlikely in practice.
Regardless, we envision a process by which each party submits what it believes to be its best
partition; the partitions submitted by the two parties can then be used to compute the geometric
target of each party. Under such a process, neither party would have a right to complain that it
was disadvantaged in the computation of the geometric target. Note that when the two parties
agree on voter distributions, the proof of Theorem 2.1 goes through and shows the feasibility of
this modification of the geometric target in our model; it is an interesting open question whether
the proof of Theorem 2.2 for the general case can be similarly extended.
Computation of GT partitions can also be incorporated into our theoretical model. We suspect
that Robertson-Webb [39] evaluation/cut queries are insufficient to compute GT partitions, since
7
If the two parties agree on voter distributions, such counterexamples cannot occur, since the proof of Theorem 2.1 constructs
an𝑚-partition with no more intervals per district than the two extreme𝑚-partitions.
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it seems impossible to even compute the best and worst𝑚-partitions for each party using this
information, and thus it may be impossible to compute the 𝑋𝑖 sets, which form the starting point
of our protocol. Is there a richer query model under which it is possible to compute a GT partition
using a finite number of queries?
Another limitation of our work is that it only applies to the case of two parties. The first obstacle
to extending beyond two parties is conceptual: it is unclear whether the geometric target has a
natural analog in that setting. We do not view this as a major issue, though, as our work is directly
motivated by the process of redistricting in the United States, which essentially has a two-party
system.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, our results show that it is possible and practical to guar-
antee fairness even in a climate of extreme partisanship. This is an insight that, we believe, could
prove invaluable to state legislatures and independent redistricting commissions as they prepare
for the next round of redistricting based on the 2020 census.
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A PROOF OF LEMMA 2.3
Let 𝑓 denote the density function of 𝑣 . Without loss of generality, we may assume that 𝐷 = [0, 𝑡]
where 𝑡 = ` (𝐷), for otherwise we could simply rearrange the finite number of intervals comprising
𝐷 so that this is the case and adapt the proof accordingly. Define functions 𝑔 : [0, 2𝑡] → [0, 1] by
𝑔(𝑥) :=
{
𝑓 (𝑥) if 𝑥 ≤ 𝑡
𝑓 (𝑥 − 𝑡) if 𝑥 > 𝑡





Intuitively, for any 𝑥 ∈ [0, 𝑡], ℎ(𝑥) is the value of a piece of measure 𝑠𝑡 that begins at 𝑥 , wrapping


































































































Since ℎ is clearly continuous, by the intermediate value theorem there must exist some 𝑥∗ ∈ [0, 𝑡]
at which ℎ attains its average value. If 𝑥∗ + 𝑠𝑡 ≤ 𝑡 , then we define
𝐷1 := [𝑥∗, 𝑥∗ + 𝑠𝑡] .
In this case,








𝑔(𝑦)𝑑𝑦 = ℎ(𝑥∗) = 𝑠𝑣 (𝐷).
If 𝑥∗ + 𝑠𝑡 > 𝑡 , we instead define
𝐷1 := [𝑥∗, 𝑡] ∪ [0, 𝑥∗ + 𝑠𝑡 − 𝑡] .
Note that these intervals are both contained within 𝐷 = [0, 𝑡] and are non-overlapping since 𝑠 ≤ 1
(except possibly at the point 𝑥∗ in the case where 𝑠 = 1). Therefore,
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= 𝑠𝑣 (𝐷).
Thus, in either case, we have found a district 𝐷1 satisfying properties (3) and (4). Letting
𝐷2 := 𝐷 \ 𝐷1
(the closure of 𝐷 \ 𝐷1), properties (1) and (2) are automatically satisfied. Furthermore,
` (𝐷2) = ` (𝐷) − ` (𝐷1) = ` (𝐷) − 𝑠` (𝐷) = (1 − 𝑠)` (𝐷)
and
𝑣 (𝐷2) = 𝑣 (𝐷) − 𝑣 (𝐷1) = 𝑣 (𝐷) − 𝑠𝑣 (𝐷) = (1 − 𝑠)𝑣 (𝐷),
so 𝐷2 satisfies properties (3) and (4) as well. □
B PROOF OF THEOREM 2.2: MAJORITY CASE
Suppose 𝑖 is a majority party. By Lemma 2.9, to meet the geometric target for party 𝑖 we must find





districts. We first extend (𝑃1,𝑇1) and (𝑃2,𝑇2) by
adding disjoint districts of size
1
𝑚
to (𝑃1,𝑇1) and (𝑃2,𝑇2), in alternation, until the total measure









). For each 𝑘 ∈ {1, 2}, let 𝐴𝑘 , 𝐵𝑘 ⊆ [0, 1] be comprised of all districts that party




), respectively. Note that 𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝐵1, and 𝐵2 are pairwise disjoint, have
measures that are integer multiples of
1
𝑚
, and for each 𝑘 ∈ {1, 2},







(This follows since both partitions started with the same number of districts and alternately grew
one district at a time until reaching𝑚𝑖 districts, so the maximum number of districts either partition





.) Let 𝐶 be the remaining part of the interval,
𝐶 := [0, 1] \ (𝐴1 ∪𝐴2 ∪ 𝐵1 ∪ 𝐵2) .
There are a few different sub-cases to consider, depending on the advantage of party 𝑖 in each of
these five districts. First suppose that, for some 𝑘 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2},
𝑣𝑖𝑖 (𝐴𝑘 𝑗 ∪ 𝐵𝑘 𝑗 ) ≤
` (𝐴𝑘 𝑗 ∪ 𝐵𝑘 𝑗 )
2
. (6)
Then it must be the case that
𝑣𝑖𝑖 ( [0, 1] \ (𝐴𝑘 𝑗 ∪ 𝐵𝑘 𝑗 )) ≥
` ( [0, 1] \ (𝐴𝑘 𝑗 ∪ 𝐵𝑘 𝑗 ))
2
, (7)
for otherwise, summing (6) with the negation of (7), we would have that 𝑣𝑖𝑖 ( [0, 1]) < 12 , contradicting









. Property (4) of Lemma 2.4 and inequality (7) imply that party 𝑖 will
win all of these districts (as long as we break ties in favor of 𝑖). Thus, using these disjoint districts




) (which is itself an extension of (𝑃𝑘 𝑗 ,𝑇𝑘 𝑗 )), by Lemma 2.9, we have met the
geometric target for party 𝑖 .
Now suppose instead that, for all 𝑘 ∈ {1, 2},
𝑣𝑖𝑖 (𝐴𝑘 ∪ 𝐵𝑘 ) ≥
` (𝐴𝑘 ∪ 𝐵𝑘 )
2
. (8)
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` (𝐶) ≤ ` (𝐴1) + ` (𝐴2). (10)




, this means that




We proceed similarly as in the last part of the proof of Lemma 2.6. Letting 𝑌 := 𝐵1 ∪𝐵2 ∪𝐶 , we have
` (𝑌 ) = ` (𝐵1) + ` (𝐵2) + ` (𝐶)



























from inequality (9) and the fact that party 𝑖 loses all districts in 𝐵1 and 𝐵2, and




since party 𝑖 is a majority party. Therefore, by Lemma 2.5, we have




Thus, we have shown that inequality (10) holds. It is therefore possible to subdivide 𝐶 into two
districts 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 such that, for each 𝑘 ∈ {1, 2},
` (𝐶𝑘 ) ≤ ` (𝐴𝑘 ). (13)
Since 𝑖 is a majority party, and 𝐴1, 𝐵1, 𝐶1, 𝐴2, 𝐵2, and 𝐶2 form a partition of [0, 1] into districts that
only overlap at endpoints,
0 ≤ 𝑣𝑖𝑖 ( [0, 1]) −




𝑣𝑖𝑖 (𝐴1 ∪ 𝐵1 ∪𝐶1) −





𝑣𝑖𝑖 (𝐴2 ∪ 𝐵2 ∪𝐶2) −




so the two terms in parentheses cannot both be negative. Let 𝑘𝑖 ∈ {1, 2} be such that
𝑣𝑖𝑖 (𝐴𝑘𝑖 ∪ 𝐵𝑘𝑖 ∪𝐶𝑘𝑖 ) ≥
` (𝐴𝑘𝑖 ∪ 𝐵𝑘𝑖 ∪𝐶𝑘𝑖 )
2
and let 𝑘 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2} be the other index, so 𝑘𝑖 ≠ 𝑘 𝑗 . As was done in the case where party 𝑖 was the




) (which is itself an extension of (𝑃𝑘 𝑗 ,𝑇𝑘 𝑗 )) by applying Lemma
2.4 to 𝑣𝑖𝑖 with
𝑠 :=
1
𝑚` (𝐴𝑘𝑖 ∪ 𝐵𝑘𝑖 ∪𝐶𝑘𝑖 )
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to cut
⌊
𝑚` (𝐴𝑘𝑖 ∪ 𝐵𝑘𝑖 ∪𝐶𝑘𝑖 )
⌋
districts from 𝐴𝑘𝑖 ∪ 𝐵𝑘𝑖 ∪𝐶𝑘𝑖 , which we can ensure are all won by
party 𝑖 by breaking ties in favor of party 𝑖 . Note that these districts clearly have the target size 1
𝑚
from property (3) of Lemma 2.4. The remainder of [0, 1] can be partitioned arbitrarily; denote by
(𝑃,𝑇 ) the resulting𝑚-partition of [0, 1]. Recall that party 𝑖 also wins all𝑚` (𝐴𝑘 𝑗 ) districts from 𝐴𝑘 𝑗 .
Thus, the total number of districts they win is
𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝑃,𝑇 ) ≥
⌊
𝑚` (𝐴𝑘𝑖 ∪ 𝐵𝑘𝑖 ∪𝐶𝑘𝑖 )
⌋
+𝑚` (𝐴𝑘 𝑗 )
=𝑚` (𝐴𝑘𝑖 ∪ 𝐵𝑘𝑖 ∪𝐶𝑘𝑖 ) +𝑚` (𝐴𝑘 𝑗 )
(since ` (𝐴𝑘𝑖 ∪ 𝐵𝑘𝑖 ∪𝐶𝑘𝑖 ) is an integer multiple of 1/𝑚)
=𝑚
(









1 − ` (𝐴𝑘 𝑗 ) − ` (𝐵𝑘 𝑗 )
)






Hence, by Lemma 2.9, the geometric target of party 𝑖 is satisfied. □
C EMPIRICAL RESULTS OMITTED FROM SECTION 3.2
In Section 3.2 we report the effect of enforcing the geometric target constraint on competitiveness
and compactness in Texas. Here we report the full results for the range of deviations considered.




Fig. 7. The largest number of competitive districts among GT partitions compared to the maximum observed
(black dotted line) for each of the deviations considered. The color of the bar represents which party deviates.
The golden bar reports the case when neither party deviates.




Fig. 8. The smallest absolute efficiency gap among GT partitions compared to the best observed efficiency
gap (black dotted line), and a threshold of 8% (green dotted line). The color of the bar represents which party
deviates. The golden bar reports the case when neither party deviates.




Fig. 9. The most compact GT partitions compared to the best Polsby-Popper score observed (black dotted
line) for each of the deviations studied. The color of the bar represents which party deviates. The golden bar
reports the case when neither party deviates.
